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NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL GOOD MEN...
LLOYD N. CUTLER*
The American Constitution usually is described as a system
based on Montesquieu's principle of the separation of powers. In
reality, as Richard Neustadt has observed, it is a system based on
the principle of separate branches exercising shared powers.'
In Philadelphia, Montesquieu's adherents won at best only half
a loaf.2 Indeed, the Convention's failure to adopt the other half
was the main argument of those who opposed ratification. As the
Federalist papers (Nos. 47-51) make clear, the framers decided to
blur the strict separation of powers in order to advance the equally
important and "nearly irreconcilable" 3 principle of checks and bal-
ances. They decided the best way to maintain checks and balances
among the branches was to allow at least one other branch to share
in each power principally assigned to a different branch. As
Madison stated in The Federalist No. 48, "unless these depart-
ments be so far connected and blended as to give each a constitu-
tional control over the others, the degree of separation which the
maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in
practice be duly maintained. '4
The Constitution contains many examples of connected and
blended powers. No branch, not even the judiciary, can exercise its
principal powers free of some control by at least one of the other
two branches. Congress must present its legislation to the Presi-
dent, who can veto subject to a two-thirds override by both
Houses.5 The President must submit his appointments and agree-
* Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C. B.A., 1936, LL.B., 1939, LL.D.
(Hon.), 1983, Yale University. Portions of this essay originally appeared at Cutler, Party
Government Under the American Constitution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 25 (1985).
1. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 101 (1976).
2. F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 258-60 (1985).
3. Id. at 82.
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 146 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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ments with other nations to the advice and consent of the Senate.6
His acts as Commander in Chief, in conducting foreign policy and
in executing the laws, can be sharply restricted by congressional
legislation or refusals to grant his legislative requests, or by the
last resort of impeachment.7 Actions of Congress or the President,
or of both acting together, can be set aside as unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court.8 Congress and the President can check the
courts by the appointment/confirmation process and by exercising
their power under article III to enact laws defining the jurisdiction
of the lower courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.9
As is true of all shared powers, the sharers of power must figure
out a way to cooperate with one another, or the result is deadlock.
We sometimes tend to congratulate ourselves on the supposed vir-
tues of inefficiency and stalemate in democratic government, but
the constitutional convention was convened because of the utter
despair of its members over governance under the Articles of Con-
federation. Although the framers carefully protected against the
risk of tyranny, they also tried to design a system that would be
more efficient than the one that it was intended to replace. 10
The resulting system of separate branches exercising shared
powers has worked well to prevent another tyranny, and continues
to do so. For the first 160 years of the Republic-until about
1950-it also permitted the national government to function
powerfully and decisively when a need for bold action arose at
home or abroad. For the last four decades, however, the national
government has been characterized by an abnormally high degree
of deadlock on major issues of domestic and foreign policy. I be-
lieve the explanation lies in the changing role of our national polit-
ical parties.
6. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
7. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
10. F. McDONALD, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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The original Constitution makes no mention of political par-
ties." Indeed, in The Federalist No. 10, Madison vigorously criti-
cizes "faction" as the bane of all republics, and describes the sys-
tem of separate branches as designed specifically to prevent the
"mischiefs of faction.' 1 2 Yet he was careful to define "faction" as
those who join to pursue a selfish interest "adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community."' 3 That definition would not appear to cover a broadly
based national political party that cuts across narrow interest
groups.
In any event, when Madison and the other framers confronted
the practical problem of making their brave new system work, they
found it necessary to offset the centrifugal force inherent in the
separate executive and legislative branches with a countervailing
centripetal force. They proceeded to organize two broadly based
national political parties, one led by Hamilton and Adams and
committed to the concept of an expansive central government, and
the other led by Jefferson and Madison and committed to the con-
cept of more limited central government. The elected President
and the elected legislators of the same party had a greater natural
affinity for cooperation with one another than with the legislators
of the other party, and this affinity tended to offset the institu-
tional wariness between the Executive and Congress in exercising
their shared powers. This "two-party" system has continued to the
present day, although a shift of magnetic polarity has developed in
the sense that the present Democratic party, the direct descendant
of the party of Jefferson and Madison, has come to favor expansive
central government, while the present Republican party, the indi-
rect descendant of the party of Hamilton and Adams, has come to
favor more limited central government.
Although this "two-party" system continues, its success in fos-
tering cooperation between the branches has declined remarkably.
In thirty-five out of the thirty-eight presidential elections held
from John Adams's victory in 1796 through Harry Truman's in
11. In the Constitution as amended to date, the only reference to the existence of parties
is an indirect one. The 24th amendment abolishes the poll tax for "any primary or other
election." U.S. CONsT. amend. XXIV, § 1.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 17 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981).
13. Id.
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1948, the party winning control of the White House also won a
majority in both the House and the Senate. This proposition held
true for ninety-two percent of these elections. 14 The only excep-
tions in the nineteenth century were the elections of Zachary Tay-
lor, Rutherford B. Hayes and Grover Cleveland for his first term.15
In the twentieth century, until Dwight Eisenhower won his second
term in 1956, the party winning the White House always won con-
trol of the House and Senate.' 6 Eisenhower's second term, how-
ever, signalled the beginning of a polar shift: the party winning the
White House has failed to win a majority of one or both Houses in
six out of the last nine presidential year elections.17 And starting
with Richard Nixon's first election in 1968, the party winning con-
trol of the White House has failed to win a majority of one or both
Houses in five out of the last six presidential year elections.
The modern phenomenon of divided government is the main
reason we now have deadlocked government most of the time. The
close correlation between the two is illustrated by the persistent
high budget deficits and by the recurring struggles between the
President and Congress over the use of American military forces or
weapons around the world.
High budget deficits, of course, are not an intended goal of na-
tional policy. Presidents and congressional leaders of both parties
oppose high deficits, and most polls show that the public shares
this view by a large margin.'" High deficits occur when the Presi-
dent and Congress cannot form a consensus on a mix of taxes and
competing expenditure programs that will create a reasonable bal-
ance between inflows and outflows. High deficits are the conse-
14. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 (PART 2) 1083 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
HISTORICAL STATISTICS].
15. See id. When Republican James A. Garfield was elected in 1880, his party won a
majority in the House and an even split in the Senate, which they were able to control with
the tie-breaking vote of the Vice President. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id. (elections until 1970); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1988, at 242 (1987) [hereinafter STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT 1988] (elections after 1970).
18. See Times Mirror Co. poll conducted by the Gallup Organization, May 13-22, 1988.
Fifty-nine percent of 3021 adults surveyed nationwide said deficits were a "bad thing"; 20%
disagreed; 5% responded that deficits were neither good nor bad; and 16% were undecided.
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quence of deadlock between the executive and legislative branches
in the exercise of their shared power to legislate.
In modern times high deficits have occurred only with divided
government. Economists generally accept that three percent or
more of the GNP is the telltale sign of an unacceptably high defi-
cit.19 We have had ten such deficits since World War II. Every sin-
gle one occurred during a time of divided government-Truman's
in fiscal 1948, Ford's in 1975 and 1976, and Reagan's seven in 1982
through 1988.20 The correlation between unacceptably high deficits
and divided government is much too exact to be a coincidence.
Largely because of the undeclared war in Vietnam, Congresses
and Presidents since Richard Nixon's first election in 1968 have
been in constant struggle over another part of their shared pow-
ers-the power to deploy and use our own armed forces abroad
and to supply weapons to other governments and insurgent forces.
Other contributors to this issue have described the constitutional
ambiguities that give rise to this struggle.2 1 The significant point is
that the War Powers Resolution itself was enacted over President
Nixon's veto at a time of divided government, and that every sub-
sequent executive-legislative dispute over the application of the
Resolution (the Marines in Lebanon, the reprisal attack on Libya,
the invasion of Grenada and the current naval deployment in the
Persian Gulf) has arisen during a time of divided government.
Similarly, Congress has checked the President by setting aside or
refusing to authorize weapons transfers to foreign governments or
insurgents only during times of divided government. Congress
blocked President Nixon's proposed arms sales to Turkey after the
1974 Cyprus crisis. Congress checked President Reagan on pro-
posed weapons transfers to the armed forces of the governments of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan22 and to the insurgent contras in
19. See, e.g., J. McKENNA, AGGREGATE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 242-44 (3d ed. 1969).
20. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT, FISCAL YEAR 1989, 6g-40, Table 19.
21. See, e.g., Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Prac-
tices, 30 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1989).
22. See Tompa, The Arms Export Control Act and Congressional Codetermination Over
Arms Sales, 1 Am. U. J. INT'L L. AND POL'Y 291, 322-25 (1986) (arms for Saudi Arabia and
Jordan); Pear, Deal is Outlined for U.S. to Sell Arms to Kuwait, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1988,
at 1, col. 1 (Hawk D missiles for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait).
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Nicaragua, 3 as well as to the police forces of South Africa and
South Korea. 4
Conversely, during President Carter's administration-the only
unified government since 1968-Congress never challenged the
President's deployment or use of our forces abroad, for example in
the attempt to rescue our hostages in Iran. Further, although Con-
gress insisted on various minor modifications, Congress never acted
to block his arms transfers to Arab governments, to El Salvador
and to the insurgents in Afghanistan.25 Once again, the correlation
between divided government and deadlock on these critical foreign
policy-national security issues is too exact to be a coincidence.
Another political sea change helps to explain the remarkable rise
in the incidence of divided government: the steady decline since
World War II in voter loyalty to a single party. Until recently,
most voters regarded themselves as Republicans or Democrats and
voted for all of their favored party's candidates for the open of-
fices, at least at the federal level. Today thirty percent of all vot-
ers, and approximately one-half of young voters, regard themselves
as independents rather than as adherents of a party.26 Even those
who still register as Democrats or Republicans have developed a
penchant for "ticket splitting"-voting for one party's candidate
for President and the other party's candidate for member of the
House or Senate. For example, in 1900 the voters in less than four
percent of all congressional districts cast a majority of their ballots
for one party's candidate for President and the other party's candi-
date for the House. Most of them voted what politicians call the
"straight ticket" of their party. Since then, the percentage of ticket
splitting has increased steadily, until in 1984 the voters in forty-
five percent of all congressional districts cast a majority of their
23. See 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 75-80 (1985); see generally HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM.,
CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY SERIES No. 7, EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION ON U.S.
ARMS SALES (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION].
24. See Forsythe, Congress and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Fate of Gen-
eral Legislation, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 383 (1987).
25. See EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION, supra note 23.
26. "Young voters" includes voters between 18 and 29. See G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL:
PUBLIC OPINION 1987, at 124, 236 (1988 ed.); J. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF
CONGRESS 477 (1981).
27. N. ORNSTEIN, T. MANN & M. MALBIN, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1984-1985 EDI-
TION 56 (1984).
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votes for President Reagan and for the Democratic candidate for
the House. 8 Estimates vary widely as to how many voters in re-
cent presidential elections split their federal tickets. According to
James Sundquist, less than one-fourth of them did so in 1984,
while George Ranney noted that two-thirds of them did so in-
1980.29
The weakening voter loyalty to a particular party is the result of
many factors, most of them probably irreversible. Changes in tech-
nology have had a major impact. In the days of paper ballots,
straight ticket voting was promoted by each party's practice of
having its workers outside the polling place offer each voter a
printed ballot bearing only the names of its own candidates for
each office. The voter then could place the printed ballot directly
into the ballot box. These straight ticket ballots were much easier
to use than the official ballot carrying the names of all candidates
and requiring the voter to check the preferred name for each of-
fice.30 This handy arrangement became outmoded with the shift
from paper ballots to state-supplied voting machines. The develop-
ment of radio and television was an even more important techno-
logical change, exposing individual candidates to many more voters
than in the past and permitting candidates to impress their indi-
vidual personalities on each voter's mind. Until political radio
broadcasts became widespread in the 1930s, whether even one per-
cent of all voters actually heard or saw the presidential candidates
is doubtful. Even the Senate and House candidates were heard and
seen by much lower percentages of their constituents than they are
today. Now that all candidates can expose their individual charac-
teristics to all voters, the candidate's party label has much less
significance.
The other principal factors that led to the decline in voter party
loyalty are the "progressive" reforms of the patronage system and
of the nominating and electoral processes. These reforms began
before the turn of the century and continue to this day. Under the
28. This figure is derived from the data in M. BARONE & G. UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 1986 (1985).
29. See J. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 88 (1986);
Ranney, What Constitutional Changes Do Americans Want? in THIS CONSTITUTION: A Bi-
CENTENNIAL CHRONICLE 13, 18 (1984).
30. See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 29, at 80.
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patronage system, local, state and national party leaders dispensed
government jobs. Even welfare and medical assistance to the needy
was often provided directly through party leaders, rather than by
the government as such." The shift to a professional civil service
and state welfare systems deprived the parties of these important
tools for cementing voter loyalty. With the introduction of the pri-
mary system for party nominations, the power to nominate passed
from party leaders to the voters at large, and candidates became
free to go over the heads of the leaders in direct appeals to voters.
Once primaries became widespread, candidates no longer de-
pended on the party to finance their nomination and election cam-
paigns; they turned instead to well-heeled individuals and interest
groups, who quickly learned they could exert far more influence on
the issues by giving money directly to candidates than by giving
money to a political party.
Another remarkable consequence of these developments has
been the transfer of political power from party leaders, both in and
out of office, to individual candidates for the House and Senate.
Incumbent Congressmen and Senators who become candidates for
reelection are the most conspicuous beneficiaries of this transfer.
The views of party leaders are far less important to these candi-
dates than the views of the individuals and interest groups who
provide the candidates with the money needed to win election or
reelection.
Incumbent candidates, of course, can deliver more immediate
legislative results than mere challengers. This fact enables them to
raise much more money for the next campaign than their challeng-
ers, giving incumbents an enormous advantage in primary and gen-
eral elections. They not only have more money; they have it much
earlier, a factor that discourages many would-be challengers from
even making the race.2 In 1986, an astounding ninety-eight per-
cent of all House incumbents of both parties who ran for reelection
31. Id. at 178.
32. Federal Election Committee records show that as of June 30, 1988, four months
before the election, congressional incumbents of both parties had raised an average of
$257,506, compared to $30,117 for challengers. Political Action Committees, who provided
40% of these funds, gave over 95% of their contributions to incumbents. Wash. Post, Aug.
29, 1988, at A4, col. 4.
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were reelected."3 Equally astounding, over the past thirty years a
weighted average of ninety percent of all House and Senate incum-
bents of both parties who ran for reelection were reelected, even at
times when their own party lost control of the Presidency itself.3 4
As these statistics show, even when the congressional minority
party wins control of the White House, it faces long odds in its
efforts to win back a majority of the House and Senate. This result
is in sharp contrast to what happens in parliamentary governments
in which the chief executive is not elected by a separate ballot.
When Canada voted the Liberal Party out of power in 1984, only
sixty percent of all incumbents who ran for reelection, and only
twenty-six percent of all Liberal incumbents, were reelected.35
Canada's economic and cultural patterns are very similar to our
own, but modern Canadian voters, with only one federal ballot to
cast, remain much more party-conscious than American voters
with multiple federal ballots to cast.
One may fairly ask what is so bad about the rising phenomenon
of divided government. Many thoughtful people fully recognize the
cost of deadlock but see a heavier cost in a return to party loyalty
and unified government.3 They regard the hodgepodge of inconsis-
tent national decisions and nondecisions under divided govern-
ment as the best available consensus that can be achieved among
the diverse interest groups that make up so huge and variegated a
nation. They see the consensus as conceding enough to each group
to avoid a degree of divisiveness that would impair the national
unity. They fear that unified government would give an adminis-
tration too much power to work its will, leading to the kind of ex-
treme swings in national policy that have occurred since World
War II in the United Kingdom and creating the bitterness that has
grown among Britain's competing interest groups. They also note
that in 1974 divided government helped to expose the excesses of
an arbitrary and corrupt President and force his resignation. They
33. See 42 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 11-B, 14-B (1986).
34. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1988, supra note 17, at 242, 244.
35. Letter from Allan Gotlieb, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, to the author
(Dec. 18, 1984).
36. See generally Schlesinger, Leave the Constitution Alone (1982), in REFORMING AMER-
ICAN GOVERNMENT 50 (D. Robinson ed. 1985) (constitutional reform moving towards a par-
liamentary system would eliminate a crucial check on executive power).
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read the results of the 1984 election, with its wide degree of ticket
splitting, as showing that many who voted for President Reagan
affirmatively wanted the insurance policy of a Democratic majority
in the House. They would interpret the reelection of the President
and ninety-five percent of the congressional incumbents of both
parties in 1984 as a public endorsement of divided government.
Woodrow Wilson had a very different view. When Wilson ran for
President in 1912 the Republicans controlled the White House and
Senate, but the Democrats had won back control of the House.
One of Wilson's major campaign themes was the importance of
unified government. As he put it in a Philadelphia speech:
The most interesting thing about the government of the
United States is that under its constitutional balances it
postpones everything. You can capture your House of Repre-
sentatives in any second-year period, but you cannot capture
your Senate in two years; and it may be that at the time you
capture your House you haven't a chance to capture your Presi-
dency. The present House of Representatives is Democratic be-
cause the Republican party broke its promises. But, even with
the assistance of the independent Republicans in the Senate of
the United States, it wasn't possible to put the program for
which the country had been waiting past the veto of the Presi-
dent. So that you have an arrested government. You have a gov-
ernment that is not responding to the wishes of the people. You
have a government that is not functioning, a government whose
very energies are stayed and postponed. If you want to release
the force of the American people, you have got to get possession
of the Senate and the Presidency as well as of the House."'
Under Wilson's leadership, the Democrats recaptured the White
House and control of the Senate as well as the House.3 9 The result-
ing unified government enacted Wilson's "New Freedom" program,
generally regarded as the most constructive period of domestic leg-
islation between the abolition of slavery and the New Deal.40 The
37. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 14, at 1083.
38. W. WILSON, A CROSSROADS OF FREEDOM 496 (1956).
39. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 14, at 1083.
40. See generally Hofstader, The Conservative as Reformer, in WILSON 148-52 (J.
Braeman ed. 1972) (New Freedom was an effective synthesis of progressivism and
conservatism).
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unified government was also able to conduct a cautious but deci-
sive foreign policy that brought us into World War I on the side of
the Allies. Yet when the Democrats lost control of the Senate in
1918, Wilson failed to carry his most important initiative - the
ratification of the Versailles Treaty, which brought his vision of a
League of Nations into being.. Of all the deadlocks produced by
divided American government, our failure to join the League was
probably the most fateful. With the United States as a leading
member, the League might well have prevented the aggressions of
the Axis Powers that led to World War II.
Wilson's 1912 views remain valid today. On balance, the negative
values of divided government clearly outweigh the positive ones,
while the positive values of unified government clearly outweigh
the negative ones. My reasons are as follows:
- Our national government makes far more major decisions today
than ever before. The competing interests involved in each deci-
sion are much more complex, but the decisions still must be made.
We hold government responsible today not merely for the goals set
forth in the preamble of the Constitution - to establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility, and provide for the national defense.
We also hold government responsible for the management of the
national and world economies and the defense of the entire free
world. Even conservative incumbents like President Reagan now
accept this broad mandate.
- Because of the growing interdependence between our own na-
tional economy, national security, and domestic tranquility and
that of other nations, many of our government's decisions involve
reaching and keeping agreements with other governments. As the
Italian Prime Minister so vividly put it at the Venice Economic
Summit of 1981, "we are all in the same gondola."'41 Without uni-
fied government, agreements with other governments are extraor-
dinarily difficult to make because the danger of checkmate or
deadlock is so high.42 In times of divided government, the Presi-
41. See generally Venice Economic Summit, 87 DFP'T OF STATE BULLETIN, Aug. 1987, at 1
(summarizing the events and accomplishments of the summit).
42. The problem is of course aggravated by the constitutional requirement that a two-
thirds vote of the Senate is required for its consent to a treaty. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Over 40 treaties submitted to the Senate since World War fl either have been rejected or
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dent of the United States is likely to be the only major head of
government who cannot commit the government he heads.
- In a divided government, both parties and their elected officials
usually condemn the resulting hodgepodge of outcomes, yet man-
age to avoid being held accountable for them. As we have seen, the
ability of incumbents of both parties to shift the blame and win
reelection has been phenomenal. A unified government usually will
be held accountable for its errors and omissions-such as an intol-
erably high deficit-at the next election. A divided government
will not; indeed, most of its participants will be reelected. 43
- If we can succeed in restoring unified government, there is lit-
tle risk that we will veer from one extreme policy to its opposite, or
that significant interest groups will become severely disaffected.
We had unified government for most of the time before World War
II, and putting the split over the constitutional entrenchment of
slavery to one side, neither of these grievous consequences befell
us. In contrast to the United Kingdom, the constitutional role of
the Supreme Court limits the extremes to which unified govern-
ment can take us. The Court will not permit a unified government
to legislate beyond its constitutional powers or to impair basic con-
stitutional rights. Moreover, the security of congressional incum-
bents encourages them to vote independently of their party lead-
ers, and even a unified government cannot count on the votes of its
legislative members to carry extreme measures that they and their
financial supporters oppose. In part because of our diversity and
size, but primarily because of the separation of the branches, uni-
fied government in America has never been efficient enough to
achieve extreme and divisive results.
Unified government does not assure creative and effective gov-
ernment, but divided government comes close to assuring stagnant
and ineffective government. All of the acknowledged great Presi-
dents-the Mt. Rushmore quartet of Washington, Jefferson, Lin-
have never come to a vote. See Letter from Robert E. Dalton, Esquire, Assistant Legal
Adviser for Treaty Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to the author (Nov. 13, 1984).
43. This applies even to the incumbent President. Of the five incumbent Presidents since
World War II who ran for another term at a time of divided government (Truman, Eisen-
hower, Nixon, Ford and Reagan), all but Ford were returned to office, and Ford missed only
by a narrow margin. Conversely, the voters held President Carter accountable in 1980 for
the results of his unified government.
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coln and Theodore Roosevelt, as well as Wilson and Franklin
Roosevelt-presided over unified governments."" One can hardly
think of a single major legislative program in this century-with
the exception of the Reagan 1981 tax cuts-that was adopted dur-
ing a period of divided government; and that change occurred in
the brief honeymoon period during the first year of President Rea-
gan's first term.45
A return to unified government would not impair the congres-
sional power to oversee executive performance and curb executive
excesses. Nor would it restore the arbitrary power of party bosses
and legislative leaders. Popular primaries and the democratization
of congressional procedures are here to stay. These reforms, to-
gether with the penetrating surveillance of the investigative press,
are sufficient guarantees that the basic constitutional checks and
balances will continue to function. They do not depend on divided
government to work. The Republican Teapot Dome scandal, for
example, was exposed during a time of Republican unified govern-
ment, with Republican lawyer Owen Roberts46 playing the same
independent prosecutor's role that Archibald Cox was to fill in the
Watergate scandal half a century later.
Even if the case for reducing the current high incidence of di-
vided government is accepted, one can fairly ask whether this is
possible today, or whether the factors that have led to divided na-
tional government are now too strong to overcome. If we look be-
yond Washington, however, we can see that unified government is
not an anachronism in modern democratic society. It exists in most
of the other industrial democracies. It also exists in a substantial
number of our own states. 47 The fact that unified government con-
tinues to flourish in these other nations and in many of our own
44. Wilson presided over a unified government until the Republicans captured the Senate
for the last two years of his second term. As a result, he was unable to win Senate consent to
the Treaty of Versailles. See supra text accompanying note 38.
45. J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 29, at 76-78.
46. See Burner, Owen J. Roberts, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (1789-1969), at 2255 (1969).
47. After the 1982 elections, we had unified government in 28 of the 49 states with bicam-
eral legislatures. See 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 13-B (1982). After the 1986 elections, we had
unified government in 20 of these 49 states. See 42 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 20B-21B (1986).
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state governments is strong evidence that its recent decline in our
national government is neither inevitable nor irreversible.
If we consider the available methods of reducing the possible fre-
quency of divided government, changing our laws governing elec-
tions is preferable to the far more difficult task of adopting consti-
tutional amendments. Indeed, constitutional amendments may not
prove necessary. Although some elements of the Constitution do
raise significant barriers, unified government managed to prevail
for most of the time until about 1950.
Three possible changes in our election laws are worthy of study:
1. Providing by federal statute that the presidential election be
conducted two to four weeks before the congressional election. 8 If
voters already knew to which party they had entrusted the White
House before they cast their votes for members of the House and
Senate, they could make a more deliberate decision as to whether
they wished to give the President-elect's party a majority in both
Houses so that the party's program could be enacted. Although
voter participation in a separate and later congressional election
might be slightly lower than in the earlier presidential election, a
two-stage election would maximize the new President's chances, in
the early euphoria of his own election, to win a majority for his
party in the House and Senate. This has been the effect of the two-
stage elections now conducted in France under the Constitution of
the Fifth Republic. 49
48. Under article I, section 4 and article II, section 1 of the Constitution, Congress has
clear power to fix the day of elections to federal office, and is free to fix different days for
elections to different offices. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1932); Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 660-63 (1884).
49. Under this constitution, which creates strong separate executive and legislative
branches, the presidential term is seven years, CONST. OF THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC, re-
printed in FIVE CONSTITUTIONS art. 6 (1979), while the Assembly term (fixed by statute) is
currently five years. Id. art. 24. However, the President may dissolve the Assembly, after
consultation with the Prime Minister and Presidents of both Houses, and call for prompt
new Assembly elections. Id. art. 12. When Socialist Francois Mitterand was elected Presi-
dent in 1981 and reelected in 1988, he faced a conservative opposition majority in the As-
sembly on both occasions. Each time, he moved promptly to dissolve the Assembly and
called for a new Assembly election. See D. SINGER, Is SocIALISM DOOMED?: THE MEANING OF
MITTERAND 101-02 (1988). His party won a decisive Assembly majority in 1981 and a narrow
coalition majority in 1988. See id. (1981 election); Painton, Mitterand's Short Coattails,
TIME, June 20, 1988, at 28.
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2. Providing by federal statute that every state must include on
its official ballot for all federal elections an additional line or lever
by which a voter may (but need not) cast a block vote for all the
candidates of one party for the open federal offices. Connecticut
has such a ballot, and in 1984 President Reagan's coattails enabled
the Republicans to displace a Democratic incumbent and gain a
House seat in Connecticut, even though they lost a net of ten seats
nationwide.50
3. Amending federal campaign financing laws to provide for
public financing of congressional campaigns, on the condition that
the candidates agree not to raise or spend any other funds. This
same condition is in the law establishing the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund,51 which the Supreme Court upheld as constitu-
tional52 and which has worked remarkably well. 53 If Congress en-
acted such a law for congressional campaigns, incumbents would
lose their present money-raising advantage. The law also would
greatly enhance the congressional minority party's chances of win-
ning House and Senate majorities as well as the White House.
If these statutory measures did not achieve the desired result,
lowering some of the barriers raised by the Constitution itself
would be necessary. One significant barrier is that half of all House
and Senate elections are held in years when there is no election for
President. In these "off-year" elections, voters are even less likely
to think of a party's incumbent President and its congressional
candidates as a team. Indeed, it is a political truism that the Presi-
dent's party usually loses House and Senate seats in an off-year
election,54 thus increasing the prospects for divided government or
aggravating the tendency to deadlock in an already divided govern-
ment. This result could be corrected by amending the Constitution
to provide for four-year terms for House members, running simul-
50. See 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 16-B to 17-B (1984); 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 18-B to 19-B
(1980).
51. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1982).
52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-109 (1976) (per curiam).
53. In all four subsequent presidential elections, both major party candidates accepted
the funds and abided by the condition. H. ASHER, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND CAMPAIGN
POLITICS: VOTERS, CANDIDATES, AND CAMPAIGNS SINCE 1952, at 222 (1988 ed.).
54. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 14, 1083-84; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (two-
year term for Representatives); art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (six-year term for Senators); and art. II, § 1,
cl. 1 (four-year term for President).
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taneously with the presidential term, and for a change in the Sen-
ate term that would result in holding all Senate elections in presi-
dential election years. For example, all Senate terms could be
shortened to the same four years as the presidential term, or the
present three-class, six-year Senate term, with one-third elected
every two years, could be changed to a two-class, eight-year Senate
term, with half (one senator from each state) being elected every
presidential election year.
The other significant constitutional barrier is the Supreme
Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo55 that the first amendment bars
Congress from imposing any direct limit on campaign expendi-
tures.56 Under this ruling, and in the absence of a public campaign
financing law such as that proposed above,57 congressional incum-
bents cannot be deprived of their enormous money-raising and
money-spending advantage. This ruling severely diminishes the
congressional minority party's chances of winning congressional
majorities when it wins the White House. An amendment specifi-
cally authorizing Congress to impose reasonable statutory limits on
campaign expenditures for federal office would remove this consti-
tutional barrier to unified government.
These are all rather modest proposals. None of them would
shake the foundations of the Republic. Singly or in combination,
they would not alter the basic political system. But in my view at
least, they would significantly improve the chances of restoring
unified government as the normative condition of governance
under the American system of separate branches exercising shared
powers.
55. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
56. Id. at 39-59.
57. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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